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1.  Introduction 
Watching the television news in Amman on our way back from Iraq, with reports of 
mortar attacks and injured Americans, it seemed as though the situation had got much 
worse and we were lucky to have left. Actually, this was a mild story; throughout our 
stay, friends and relatives were anxiously watching what appeared to be an orgy of 
violence in Iraq. On the day we arrived, the first day of Ramadan, five bombs 
exploded in Baghdad, killing 41 Iraqis and one American soldier. The day before, 
rockets ripped through the Al-Rashid Hotel, where many of the Coalition staff were 
living, killing one American soldier. Indeed, every day we were there some act of 
terrorism took place. Yet this is, by no means, the whole story. And we left Iraq 
feeling that the media focus on terrorist attacks provides a highly misleading picture. 
Indeed, the disjuncture between the world's view of Iraq and how it feels inside Iraq is 
probably greater than anywhere in the world. 
Iraq to day is bustling with activity. The shops are open late at night. The roads are 
packed with lorries, cars and buses. The curfew has been lifted and people walk about 
the streets in the evenings. There are many new initiatives, including literally 
hundreds of new newspapers and magazines, self-organized neighbourhood groups, 
and a myriad of new and old political parties and associations. Internet cafes have 
sprung up everywhere. At the same time, there is no telephone system, except the 
Coalition's own system, and there are also periodic blackouts and water stoppages. 
Many people are without jobs and there are shortages of skilled people in key 
positions, for example, the universities because of de-Ba'athification. Together with 
noisy tanks on the streets, at least in the American zone, and frequent checkpoints and 
searches, these factors greatly complicate every day life even though there are 
improvements all the time. 
We talked to many people and our overriding impression was of mixed feelings. 
Almost everyone expressed hope for the future but nevertheless they were not 
completely confident that their troubles were over. Everyone was happy that Saddam 
Hussein had been overthrown and yet the losses and traumas of the last twenty years 
as well as the doubts about the present made it impossible to celebrate. 
The war is referred to as 'liberation/occupation'. Many people, especially men, hate 
Saddam Hussein and the Americans in equal measure. They are angry at the ever-
growing list of Iraqi casualties both civilian and military. They feel humiliated by the 
rapid American victory, their failure to liberate themselves, and by the patronising and 
sometimes insensitive behaviour of the occupiers. A similar ambiguity characterises 
the dominant view of the 'resistance'. They feel it is wrong and they hate the violence 
but nevertheless few Iraqis stand up publicly and oppose the attacks. Sometimes, they 
even express satisfaction when Americans are killed. 
An analysis of the situation in Iraq has to take into account the complexity and 
unprecedented nature of the current conjuncture. Iraqi society is composed of 
overlapping ethnic, religious, tribal cleavages with crosscutting political tendencies - 
this complexity is both divisive and potentially stabilising. There are plenty of 
possible causes of conflict but there are also plenty of counter-balancing forces. In 
addition, the combination of state-building, post-totalitarian transition, post-war 
reconstruction, and foreign occupation represents uncharted territory. Some elements 
of the situation are reminiscent of Russia, Bosnia, Nigeria or Afghanistan but the 
combination is new. 
Above all, the paradoxes are personified by many extraordinary individuals with 
fascinating stories to tell. One of the key personalities is Sheikh Abdul Karim Al-
Mahood we described among ourselves as Robin Houdini. He effected a miraculous 
escape from one of Saddam's gaols and then survived as a rebel leader in the marshes 
to the South. Now he is a member of the Governing Council and dominates the 
politics of Maysan, a British occupied governorate in the South. Other examples 
include the Sandhurst trained military officer who runs a pizza parlour that serves 
alcohol even during Ramadan and bows smartly to his guests, or the ex-Baathist artist 
who runs a gallery where artists could meet and discuss even during the dictatorship. 
Our central conclusion is that genuine regime change in Iraq is a dual process. On the 
one hand, it requires a rapid transfer of sovereignty by the occupying forces 
undertaken in such a way as to ensure that authority is handed over to democratic 
forces. Neither the 'tabula rasa' approach of destroying old structures and minimizing 
the role of the state nor the 'indirect rule' approach of anointing traditional leaders are 
likely to produce a sustainable democracy in Iraq. Efforts should instead focus on 
creating the space for the development of democratic institutions both in government 
and in civil society. On the other hand, Iraqi democrats need to mobilise, especially 
against the violence, in order to build political legitimacy. We will elaborate this 
argument by describing the political, security and economic aspects of the situation in 
Iraq and showing what they imply for future policies. 
 
2.  Politics 
Formally, Iraq is controlled by the CPA (the Coalition Provisional Authority). The 
CPA is stuck in what is known as the green zone -an area in the middle of Baghdad 
that includes the Al-Rashid Hotel and the former Palace built by the British and 
extended by Saddam Hussein- heavily protected by concrete walls, barbed wire, and 
American soldiers. Morale is low among both military and civilians both because of 
the way staff are confined to the green zone and because they are the primary targets 
of terrorist attacks. Because of the rocket attack on the Al-Rashid Hotel, many 
officials were sleeping in dormitories in the palace or in military barracks. To 
implement their policies, the CPA is dependent on a bevy of foreign and Iraqi exile 
'advisors', widely resented by ordinary Iraqis for their high salaries, CPA mobile 
phones, and posh cars with drivers and bodyguards 
 
2.1  Political institutions 
Iraqi political institutions are beginning to emerge though their status is as yet largely 
consultative. A Governing Council was established by the CPA composed of the main 
political forces, with a rotating Presidency. The ministries are divided among council 
members and are struggling to assert their authority vis-à-vis the CPA and its 
advisors. Similar structures are being established at the level of governorates and 
municipalities. The Governing Council is beginning to act autonomously; for 
example, it rejected the Turkish offer of troops and is opposing rapid privatisation of 
state enterprises. Nevertheless, these institutions are very weak and the gap between 
the CPA and the nascent Iraqi institutions has left a political vacuum, which the ever-
present shadow of the former regime tries to exploit. While we were in Baghdad, 
rumours abounded that a letter had been received from Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein 
calling for a general strike and threatening to attack schools and universities that used 
the new de-Ba'athised textbooks. (We were unable to discover anyone who had 
actually seen the letter). No one from the Governing Council appeared in public to 
defuse the tension and the result was that most primary school children stayed at 
home and only 2% of university students turned up on the campus of Baghdad 
University. 
Most Iraqi political parties and associations survived in exile although some had 
underground activities inside Iraq, most notably the religious parties and the 
Communist Party. There are many religious, ethnic, and tribal parties. During the 
Saddam period, religious, ethnic and tribal affiliations increased in importance. Tribal 
and religious dress is widespread -something new for those people who remember 
Iraq before the dictatorship. These particularist identities have to be understood, as in 
other parts of the world, as a 'post-modern' reconstruction, a new political response to 
contemporary conditions even though it draws on deeply held values and traditions. 
They were reconstructed, as elsewhere, both from above and from below. In part, they 
were identities instrumentalised by Saddam Hussein as a method of rule. One tribal 
leader told us that he was among those who had been called to Baghdad for a meeting 
of tribal sheikhs when the American invasion began and was given 3 million dinars to 
buy his loyalty. (He spent 1 million on a party for all his tribe and gave the rest to the 
poorest families). And in part these primary affiliations provide a framework of social 
support in a society where civic institutions have been destroyed. On our very first 
night, we saw a man in elaborate tribal dress in our hotel. Someone whispered that he 
was the 'sheikh of sheikhs', the Chairman of the Council of Tribes. He turned out to 
come from Ealing although he preferred to talk to us in Arabic because he was about 
to be interviewed by Al Jazeera TV and wanted to appear authentic. Later we 
discovered that there were many 'sheikhs of sheikhs' -various councils and 
associations. One of the sheikhs we met had played the drums in a 1970's rock band. 
The Shia parties are both religious and ethnic (a bit like Hindu nationalism). They 
include SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) based in Iran during 
the Saddam period, Da'wa based in Syria and London, and the Sadr group popular 
mostly in the poorer suburbs of Baghdad and some Southern cities where these people 
hail from. The Hawza, the supreme religious institution of Iraq's Shia, is not a 
political organization but it exerts a strong influence both through the individual Shia 
parties and independently. 
In the Sunni areas, the Iraqi Islamic Party, the successor to the Muslim Brotherhood is 
represented in the Governing Council. The National Union Party, led by firebrand 
cleric Ahmad Al-Kubaisi, along with his Shia opposite number Muqtada Al-Sadr, has 
been most vocal in confronting the coalition and the CPA. Many ex-Ba'sthists are 
allegedly joining both groups. The Kubaisi group also epitomizes the new nexus 
between the ex-Ba'thists and Salafi Islamists.(See below) 
Then there are the two Kurdish parties (PDK and PUK) and various tribal 
associations, parties and networks. The secular parties include purely exile groups like 
the INC (Iraqi National Congress) and INA (Iraqi National Accord) based in the US 
and London, or the newly established Iraqi Independent Democrats lead by Adam 
Pachachi and funded by money from the United Arab Emirates. (The headquarters of 
the Independent Democrats are rented from a sanctions busting millionaire whose 
gold bathroom fittings rivalled those to be found in Saddam's Palace housing the CPA 
headquarters). The Communist Party, like some of the religious parties, operated 
underground during the Saddam years with headquarters in Northern Iraq and many 
exile groups. The Party has branches all over the country and the various offices in 
Baghdad are teeming with people of all ages. In the provinces, the situation is sadder. 
In Amara, we found old men reminiscing about their experiences in underground cells 
with pictures of the innocent young people who were killed by Saddam on the walls. 
Finally, there are many smaller parties, many established since May, like the National 
Democrats, led by the son of a pioneer of modern politics in Iraq - Kamel Al-
Chaderji. 
Nearly all the particularist parties have armed wings or militias, like the Badr corps 
established in Iran that is controlled by SCIRI. Even some secular parties have militia. 
The INC led by Chalabi, has Free Iraqi Forces, a militia trained by the Americans in 
Hungary. 
The secular parties are strongest at the national level within the Governing Council. 
Since they are largely composed of exiles and have least capacity for mobilisation and 
because they spend much time negotiating with the CPA, they appear disconnected 
from Iraqi society. On the other hand, the particularist parties are much stronger at a 
local level. In Amara, for example, which we visited, Sheikh Al-Mahood is the 
dominant political figure and his militia are influential (see below). In other local 
areas, different parties play a similar role. Thus SCIRI, with its Badr organisation, is 
allegedly in charge in Kut. Kerbala and Najaf are divided between different Shia 
parties with the Hawza enjoying a slight edge, creating a potentially explosive 
situation. In Basra, Da'wa and SCIRI are dominant although a reportedly 
'independent' judge has been appointed Governor. (The term independent, by the way, 
have become a euphemism for Islamic in many instances) 
 
2.2 Civic initiatives 
In addition to the parties and associations actively involved in the new institutions, 
there are many new democratic and civic initiatives. Among the students, for 
example, there are many new and old unions. The most important is probably GUSIR 
(the General Union of Students) that was founded in 1948 and existed underground in 
the Saddam years. They are campaigning to restore schools and universities and to get 
back two hostels designed for 6,000 students occupied by the Coalition troops. (The 
lack of accommodation meant that many students, especially women, did not return to 
university this autumn. While we were visiting, some students had organised 
construction teams to build more hostel space in their headquarters). On the day we 
visited the University of Baghdad students were cooperating with the police to secure 
the campus against terrorists. GUSIR activists have influenced two directives by the 
CPA, one that students who failed their exams last year because of the war could still 
go into the next year and one that students suspended by Saddam Hussein be 
reinstated. They are also working on curricula changes, particularly discussing what 
should replace the compulsory course on Arab nationalism designed by the former 
regime. (We told one student that in Eastern Europe, the course on Marxist-Leninism 
had been replaced by human rights course. He said shyly that he thought Marxism 
includes human rights). As well as GUSIR there are many small unions that give 
themselves names which include the word Democratic. They are all beginning to co-
operate. 
In addition, there are the Islamist unions. The so-called Provisional Union of Students 
of Iraq, established by pro-Sadr students, asked the Minister of Higher Education to 
ban all political posters in the Universities. The Minister agreed. The other unions 
protested and the Minister changed his mind. But he then said that there should be 
only one union approved by him. The fact that rightly the students take no notice of 
this decision illustrates the weakness of the Ministries. The students are also resisting 
pressure form the Minister and the CPA for holding elections on campuses this year. 
They fear that in the current atmosphere elections will lead to violence and its better 
to wait for the next academic year. This apparently is supported by all non-Baathist 
students including the Islamists. 
One consequence of Saddam's war adventures and brutality is that women constitute 
60% of Iraq's voting age population. Many women in Iraq are aware of this and feel 
empowered by the prospect of having an opportunity to influence the country's future. 
Women also benefited from the CPA's policy of paying all public sector employees 
salaries, which at times exceed their pre-war levels by a factor of ten. Women are 
heavily represented in this sector as teachers and administrators. At the same time 
many men lost their source of income in industry and the military. This is creating a 
new dynamic within Iraqi society. On the other hand, some religious activists who 
have come to the fore since the collapse of the regime are promoting policies, which 
would further circumscribe women's freedoms. Some Iraqi activists are striving to 
counter that by integrating the gender dimension into every aspect of policy making. 
They are lobbying for the establishment of a higher women's council, which would 
bring together government and civil society to address this task. Among others, they 
are demanding that women should be allotted 30% of positions in any public body. 
There is a plethora of groups in Iraq today dealing with a broad set of issues 
associated with transitional justice. Some are cataloguing the regime's crimes and 
trying to account for its myriad victims. Others are raising funds to support those left 
behind or trying to restore properties, titles and jobs to the victims and their families. 
Yet others are trying to track down the regime's henchmen and make sure they do not 
dissolve into society. 
As well as the student unions, women's organisations and transitional justice groups, 
there are many NGOs concerned with humanitarian and environmental issues, 
democracy and civil society. Journalists, filmmakers, artists are also involved in new 
projects and discussions. Many of these initiatives are small and tentative. Iraqis have 
a huge distrust of politics, a legacy of fear and disappointment, and a lack of 
experience of self-organisation to overcome. The exception is groups, which used to 
operate underground with tightly knit organizational structures. These groups used to 
be overly political in the past. Today they are supplementing their repertoire with 
corporatist activism and voluntary sector type work in reaction to the new 
environment. They all represent the beginnings of a civic and inclusive society. 
 
2.3 The Ba'ath Party 
Finally, the Ba'ath Party and the former regime although officially disbanded is 
omnipresent. Thousands of followers, recipients of favours and fellow travellers let 
alone the regime's henchmen would have a hard time admitting that they have been 
doing the wrong thing for all these years. The ex-Ba'athist artist who has been hosting 
a gallery and café where his colleagues could meet and chat freely even under 
Saddam spoke fondly of how he used to earn enough money to last him a year from 
painting one portrait of Saddam Hussein and how this gave him the liberty to pursue 
real work. He only left the Party after the invasion of Kuwait and he insists that he felt 
safer under Saddam Hussein than now. Military officers also remember Saddam's 
annual gifts of houses and cars. It seems that the regime at times tried to bribe the 
entire middle class and many of those who benefited cannot help but feel some 
nostalgia. Anecdotal evidence suggests continued strong Baathist presence on 
campuses. Elections to the bar association which took place during our stay were 
allegedly almost won by a Baathist. 
As well as bribes, of course, Saddam's regimes used fear as a tool of power and this 
also continues today. The remnants of the regime are credited with most attacks 
taking place today although the actual suicide attackers are likely to be foreigners. 
While most Iraqis condemn the violence in private many of them stop short of acting 
against it in public. This probably reveals, in equal parts, a dislike of the occupiers, 
the main target of the attacks, distrust of their ability to protect them and fear that the 
terrorists may yet prevail. Saddam's reign of terror, it seems, is lingering where it 
counts most - the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis. The former regime is 
presumably trying to feed into this fear and perpetuate it, hence the attacks on new 
state institutions especially the police, the judiciary and schools. These are also rightly 
perceived by the former regime as a more serious challenge to its power than the 
peripheral CPA. 
 
2.4 Transfer of Sovereignty and the Constitution 
The key political priority is to accelerate the handover of sovereignty. But to whom? 
A combination of weak exiles and particularists? Or is it possible to establish a 
constitutional framework that allows for the development of democracy? 
Recently, a compromise has been reached whereby the constitutional process, which 
is bound to be drawn out, was, separated from the handover of sovereignty in order to 
accelerate the latter. A temporary Basic Law is going to be adapted next spring in 
order to facilitate the handover of sovereignty to a provisional Iraqi government by 
the middle of next year. The provisional government will be elected/selected on the 
basis of existing regional councils as well as the Governing Council. At the same time 
an agreement has been reached that the constitution will be adopted by a fully elected 
constitutional assembly in two years time. 
The Shia parties were the political grouping that insisted on an elected constitutional 
Convention, because Shia represent the numerical majority. The Ayatollah Sistani, the 
head of Hawza, called for elections to a constitutional convention, even though he is 
said to be a Quietist (i.e. non-political). But elections will not guarantee constitutional 
legitimacy especially if regional councils have undue weight in the election process. 
First, it is important that minorities and secular political forces have a genuine voice 
so that their role can be safeguarded in a future constitution and this needs to be 
reflected in the method of election. Secondly, and even more important, there does 
need to be democratic debate about the constitution - a widespread deliberation in 
universities, mosques, among women's forums - so that the Iraqi people feel for the 
first time in their history that they have ownership of their constitution. 
The most contentious issues to be discussed are the form of a future federal system, in 
particular the degree of autonomy and size of territory granted to the Kurds, and the 
degree of decentralisation. The Americans favour a weak central government but 
there is a risk that this will entrench local particularist groups. These issues can only 
be resolved through a process in which individual Iraqis feel they can have a voice if 
they choose. The role of Islam in the Constitution is also considered contentious 
although, in our view the religious parties are more concerned with representation 
than with religious issues per se. 
It is not only constitutional legitimacy that is required, even more important is 
political legitimacy. However well prepared the constitutional process, the current 
political vacuum will not be filled until there are democratic political forces who can 
win the trust of Iraqis. Key to this is political mobilisation against the violence. The 
capacity to lead their fellow citizens from passive rejection to active and public 
opposition to the violence and its perpetrators could be viewed as a potential rite of 
passage for the new democratic forces in Iraq. Only those who are able to take 
effective action to end the violence are likely to be trusted and therefore be able to 
assume leadership. Only then can one really speak about regime change. 
 
3. Security 
Many people argue that Iraq is becoming the stage for the 'war on terrorism'. All 
sides, America, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, the Jihadists, are choosing Iraq as the proxy 
battleground for the 'war' as a whole. 
Before the war, the Americans had great difficulty in proving that there was a link 
between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda. (It is interesting that American intelligence 
seems to have been unaware of the fact that the Saudis had built two Wahabi mosques 
in Iraq during the Saddam period and were allowed to proselytise freely which 
included to payment of up to $500 a month to followers.). The effect of the war has 
been to bring these two unsavoury political elements together. The Jihadis are 
enlisting in an insurgency organized and supported by the remnants of the regime. At 
the same time former Baathists are joining Jihadi organizations. Many of the foreign 
Jihadis have entered the country since the war from Syria and Iran because the 
Coalition forces did not have enough troops to guard the borders. On the one hand, it 
is argued that Islamic fighters are attracted to Iraq because it is there they can directly 
confront the Americans; moreover, regimes like Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran want to 
make as many difficulties as possible for the Coalition so as to deter any possibility 
that the United States might attack them in the future. On the other hand, conspiracy 
theorists, which abound in Iraq, like to suggest that the Americans deliberately chose 
not to close the borders so as attract Jihadists into the country where they can be 
defeated. 
The violence is directed against both the American forces and the nascent Iraqi 
security institutions, particularly police stations, judges, banks and schools. The 
terrorists are taking advantage not only of the political vacuum but of the security 
vacuum as well. 
 3.1 Coalition forces: Two approaches 
There are three main types of security actors in Iraq to day. First, there are the 
Coalition forces whose tasks are to defeat the terrorists and provide support to Iraqi 
security institutions in maintaining public order. In the American sector, morale is 
low. Soldiers are afraid and tense. Some reservists told us that they felt they had been 
conned. They were told they were coming to Iraq to dismantle weapons of mass 
destruction. Now no WMD had been found but they were not allowed to go home. 
The Americans rely heavily on private contractors composed largely of retired 
American officers to provide logistics and to undertake security tasks like guarding 
the airport. A company of ex-Gurkhas guards the airport, while MPRI (Military 
Professional Resources Inc), the company that was active in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Angola, takes care of logistical supplies. 
There is a big difference between the British and American tactics and indeed, many 
British personnel are scornful of the Americans arguing that they have no experience 
of counter-terrorism and are much too visible, clumsy and insensitive. The Americans 
refuse to report on Iraqi non-combat casualties, but evidence suggests that many 
innocent civilians are being caught up in the crossfire. Tanks are much too obvious 
and house-to-house searches and detentions are often carried out roughly and brutally. 
But whereas the Americans try to act forcefully against the terrorists and against non-
authorised military groups, the British tend to negotiate with local forces and to 
delegate security tasks to local tribal and religious leaders - a practise reminiscent of 
the 'indirect rule' of the colonial period. 
There does seem to be an intelligence problem. This is mainly because of the 
disconnectedness of the CPA and the occupying forces from Iraqi society. According 
to many reports, information passed on by Iraqis does not appear to be taken into 
account or acted upon. Iraqis believe that the Americans must know where Saddam 
Hussein is and that they are waiting for an opportune moment, say just before the 
Presidential elections, to arrest him. There are many stories about why Uday and 
Qusay were killed. It is suggested that the Americans had been keeping them under 
house arrest for some time and deliberately decide to kill them so that this would not 
be revealed and so that they could, again, choose a propitious political moment to 
claim a victory in the ongoing struggle. 
 
3.2 New Iraqi forces 
Secondly there are the nascent Iraqi security institutions. One of the biggest mistakes 
of the CPA was to dismantle the army, which was the least Ba'athised of the former 
security institutions. Even though Western security officials argue that it was easier to 
'start from scratch' because the army was so ill-equipped and badly organised, the 
decision has added to the sense of humiliation felt by Iraqis, and left many frustrated 
and angry ex-military personnel. The decision to continue the payment of stipends to 
demobilised members of the Iraqi armed forces is not being carried out according to 
ex-officers we met in Baghdad. The formation of the new army is slow because of an 
elaborate vetting process - 5,000 troops have now been trained. It is hoped to speed up 
the process so that the Army can begin to replace American troops. 
The establishment of police forces has been much faster and is one of the most 
hopeful developments in Iraq to day. Many of the most senior officers have been 
removed because of the Bremer decree on de-Ba'athification. The change in police 
behaviour was epitomised for us by the policeman who apologised for 
inconveniencing us when searching our car at a checkpoint outside the Al Hamra 
hotel. A police officer in Amara told us that police officers are 'rediscovering their 
humanity'. He said that police are behaving better because they have less authority 
and are less well protected. They also feel that were abused during the former regime 
because they were used as an instrument of Saddam's rule; now they have to learn to 
respect people. Iraqi policemen we met complained about lack of weapons and 
equipment and low salaries. The weakness of the judiciary as well as interference by 
Iraqi politicians close to the CPA in the appointment of high-ranking officers is 
further undermining their work. Some policemen were killed by coalition forces, 
which tend to treat all armed Iraqi with suspicion. In addition to the police, an Iraqi 
Civil Defence Corps (ICDC) has been established. This will undertake duties like 
border control. The ICDC has the least training (three days) and is so far the largest of 
the new institutions. 
The Iraqi judiciary is still very weak and the CPA has been slow to establish the 
institutions for transitional justice. 
 
3.3 The militias 
The third group of security actors are the para-military groups -the Peshmerga, the 
Party militias, the tribal militias. The different parties are trying to create facts on the 
ground, using their armed wings, so as to create a basis for future power. Some argue 
that some of the violence in the so called Sunni Triangle could also be understood as a 
demand for a place at the table by tribal and Islamic leaders in that area on a par with 
their Shia and Kurdish peers. 
In Amara, Sheikh Al-Mahood had organised local militia to prevent looting after the 
Americans took Baghdad and before the British arrived, effectively liberating Amara. 
These groups had been incorporated into the police force and given high-ranking 
positions, thus creating tensions within the police as well as mixed loyalties. Shortly 
before our visit, one of these newly created officers had been assassinated; it was still 
not clear whether this was the work of a rival tribe or the Sadr forces. Sheikh Al-
Mahood himself told us that it was important to eliminate unauthorised armed groups 
and to establish a 'monopoly of violence' if Iraq is to become democratic. His main 
concern is the Islamist militias. However when we asked about the problem of his 
own forces in the police, he said the CPA should train them up so that they would be 
considered of the same standard as normal police officers. 
 
 
3.4 Transferring the security portfolio 
Most Iraqi politicians are now pressing for the handover of the security portfolio to 
Iraqis. But which Iraqis? Some Iraqi political parties argue that existing para-military 
groups can maintain order. But this could turn out to be a recipe for particularist and 
criminalized violence and a huge obstacle to democratic development. The security 
portfolio should be handed to Iraqis but to Iraqi security institutions accountable to 
Iraqi political control. 
The difference between the two coalitions approaches is illustrated by the difference 
between violence in the American zone and violence in the British zone. In the 
American zone, the main violence is political -the terrorist attacks on American forces 
and Iraqi security institutions. In the British zone, there is very little terrorist violence 
giving the impression that the British zone is more secure. But there is more 
particularist/criminal violence (looting kidnapping, ransom demands, etc.). What is 
needed is a third approach more consistent with a handover of sovereignty to 
democratic forces -one that involves speeding up the establishment of Iraqi security 
institutions, the control of unauthorised armed groups, and more sensitive co-
operative behaviour by Coalition forces. 
 
4. Economy 
After three devastating wars, 12 years of sanctions and 35 years of abuse at the hands 
of the Ba'ath regime it is a miracle that anything is left in Iraq, which could be called 
an economy. Indeed, the past 30 years have been marked by a destruction of value on 
an unprecedented scale. Saddam Hussein followed every economic fad from grand 
centrally planned industrialization and agricultural collectivisation to shock therapy, 
austerity and privatisation. Economic nihilism on behalf of Iraq's rulers was 
precipitated among others by the sense of impunity, which comes from having access 
to an almost unlimited supply of cheap oil. Even this sector, however, has suffered 
due to lack of investment and over exploitation. Oil output today estimated at 1.5-2 
mbpd is at about one half of peak capacity. Estimates about the time and investment 
needed to restore that output level vary widely with some suggesting that it may never 
be possible again. 
 
Like the map of Yugoslavia under Milosevic, each of Saddam's military adventures 
left a smaller Iraqi economy in its wake. Most devastating for Iraq's economy was the 
1991 war and subsequent sanctions. Iraq was crushed into the Middle Ages through a 
combination of physical destruction and denial of cash. Even that period though had a 
silver lining. The choking off of oil revenues and rampant inflation caused by the 
liberal use of the printing press meant that non-oil sectors of the Iraqi economy 
especially agriculture have experienced a relative boom. Evidence of that are still 
visible today in Iraq and its neighbours to which agricultural products are smuggled. 
Another beneficiary from the suppression of the oil sector is the construction industry, 
which can offer competitive bids compared to Western construction firms especially 
on low complexity projects. The Iraqi contractors are also benefiting from Western 
firms' reluctance to work in the current security environment. A US military 
commander is said to have asked a US construction firm to rehabilitate a hospital. The 
firm demanded $15 million and still did not commence work due to security concerns. 
The job was done at the end by an Iraqi company for $80,000 instead. 
 
4.1 Reconstruction 
Six months after the latest war, Iraq is exhibiting some unmistakable signs of 
economic life. The main drivers of current activity are frozen assets, fresh oil 
revenues and foreign aid. These funds are used primarily to pay public sector 
employees. Policemen, schoolteachers and civil servants are receiving salaries. This is 
creating a new social and economic dynamic by empowering the very sectors of Iraqi 
society, which suffered the most in the past ten years. 
Construction and utilities are benefiting from investments into urgently needed repairs 
and cleanup work if not from major new projects. The US Corps of Engineers and the 
British military have issued millions of dollars worth of contracts to repair schools, 
hospitals and vital infrastructure. Unfortunately none of the larger rehabilitation 
projects, which require significant presence of major international corporations and 
their employees, have got off the ground. Those are being hampered both by cautious 
awarding procedures aimed at limiting politically costly accusations of corruption and 
by security concerns. Another obstacle to the commencement of major reconstruction 
projects is the ambiguity of the legal framework. According to some the occupying 
authority does not have the right to enter into any contractual arrangements beyond 
whatever is necessary for continued operation at any given enterprise. 
These delays while benefiting some Iraqi contractors are widening the gap between 
Iraqi expectations of cleanup, repairs, reconstruction, and most importantly jobs and 
what the coalition can deliver. Throughout our trip, complaints about the slow pace of 
economic reconstruction and rehabilitation were the most prevalent matching or even 
exceeding those about security. 
Although water and electricity supplies seem to have reached and at times exceeded 
their pre-war level the six months it took to do so have shaken Iraqi's confidence in 
the CPA's ability to keep its promises. 
 
4.2 Economic policy 
Economic policy today is fragmented between the CPA, the Governing Council and 
the Ministries. The ministers appointed by the council are also duplicated at the CPA 
with Iraqi and foreign advisors. The CPA has the most authority through its control of 
the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), established by UNSC resolution 1483. The 
fund, which is audited by a UN board, will accumulate not only oil revenues but also 
some of the foreign assistance and investment coming into the country including the 
$35bn pledged at the recent Madrid conference (October 2003). The GC and the 
ministries have at least nominal control over the government's budget. They also have 
some say on major policy issues and contracts funded from the DFI. Another source 
of economic power to emerge over the past few months are the regional councils, 
which have at times, separate access to funds through local coalition authorities. 
The CPA does not have a clearly formulated economic policy. Instead the dominant 
focus is on enshrining free markets and small government as the underpinnings of 
lasting democratic transformation. Nevertheless, the key role played the new Director 
of Operations in the CPA, who was formerly in charge of reconstruction in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, may indicate that actual practise may be different. 
On the ground this approach is translated in the establishment of an independent 
central bank and a new currency. The new currency does not only remove Saddam 
Hussein's image but also heralds the end of his monetary 'policy' where money supply 
was limited only by the capacity of the printing press. External trade has been 
liberalised to the point of eliminating tariffs and duties altogether. (Only an 
Investment Tax of 5% on imports will be levied for three years.) Income and 
corporate taxes are set at a flat rate of 15%. The abolition of all import duties has 
already translated in the wide availability of chap imports from cars to bananas. A 
relative of one of us, who is poor even by Iraqi standards, asked whether bananas 
might be bad for her son since he has been eating so many of them lately. The 
introduction of a low flat tax rate should as the recent experience of Russia shows 
induce better tax discipline and discourage capital flight, a characteristic infliction of 
oil dependent economies. 
The CPA is locked in a political battle with the GC and the ministers over 
privatisation. Since it was already agreed that the oil sector as well as other mineral 
sectors should be excluded from the privatisation, the battle is largely rhetorical. The 
number of enterprises suitable for privatisation outside the excluded sectors is 
estimated at 200 and would not warrant the political costs entailed in such 
confrontation. 
 
4.3 The oil fund 
In the medium to long term the pivotal issue is the framework for the management of 
the Development Fund for Iraq and oil revenues in general. There is an understanding 
that the only way of preventing the reproduction of Saddam's regime is to take oil out 
of the political process. Beyond this, however, there is little understanding of the 
specifics of oil dependent economies. In particular no policies are being put in place 
to prevent oil from stifling the development of the rest of the economy. 
Trying to pass on oil revenues or even assets to the people of Iraq could exacerbate 
rent seeking mentality and Dutch disease. Decisions on the regional distribution of oil 
may contribute to ethnic and sectarian tensions. Instead it is necessary to pursue a 
policy, which would give the Iraqi people ownership of the oil assets while allowing a 
central authority such as an oil fund to determine the best way to manage them. The 
main goal of the fund is to use various asset management tools including investment 
in Iraq and abroad to maximise Iraq's wealth and smooth revenues over the long term. 
A critical task of such an authority is to take oil revenues out of the executive's 
control and prevent them from becoming instruments in the political process. The 
Iraqi executive should be dependent on tax rather than oil revenues for its ongoing 
expenditures. This would provide an economic basis for government accountability. 
In order to be able to discharge these tasks the oil fund should have the same level of 
independence as the central bank. This could for example be achieved by appointing 
the fund's board for periods longer than those of the parliament and or the president. 
The electoral cycle for the board should not overlap with that of other government 
institutions. Neutralizing the negative impact of oil on the rest of the economy is a 
task, which will have to be addressed by the central bank, the ministry of finance and 
the fund. It is therefore important that these three organizations have an 
institutionalised coordination mechanism. The fund will likely engage in international 
capital market transactions of a large scale. As such it could benefit from coordination 
with international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. This 
could even include the appointment of a board member from one of these institutions. 
The fund should be audited by a reputable accounting firm and should be subject to 
peer review by financial institutions of similar size and scope such as large investment 
houses and fund managers. 
In order to ensure Iraqi ownership, the fund should have a rigorous and open reporting 
mechanism. Any Iraqi citizen should have the right to know the exact state of the 
funds finances to the last detail. A mechanism should be in place to consult the 
general public on the funds strategies and investment decisions. Citizens should also 
have a mechanism to contest investment and spending decisions they disagree with. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We see very little possibility of renewed dictatorship in Iraq; the model of closed 
authoritarian society is increasingly difficult to sustain in an era of global 
communications. The real risk is the weak state scenario, characterised by weak rule 
of law, low-level but pervasive violence, and entrenched local particularist political 
fiefdoms. In such a scenario, the former regime and the Islamic fighters would 
become just another element in a particularist mosaic. The only way to prevent such a 
scenario is for Iraqis to establish their own democratic institutions and to take 
ownership of those institutions. 
At present there are two different approaches that are dominant among the CPA. One 
is the ideological approach to be found mainly among Americans, especially among 
the former American Republican staffers and right-wing think tank people. Their goal 
is to impose an American model of 'free market democracy' (to quote a senior official 
in the governance department). The model anticipates a minimal state and a neo-
liberal economy. They have produced a strategic plan for rapid implementation of this 
model to be completed, with luck, before the next Presidential elections. They have 
specified the steps and milestones to be achieved in the process as well as various 
indicators of performance. One official told us that 'we have to finish quickly because 
although we know best how to do nation-building, political pressure will force us to 
hand over sovereignty to the Iraqis who don't know how to do it as well as us.' Like 
transition recipes in post-communist countries, destruction of existing institutions is a 
precondition for building the model -hence, the dismantling of the army, the Bremer 
decree on de-Ba'athification and the insistence on rapid privatisation of state 
enterprises, even though this is illegal for occupying forces. As well as the bevy of 
'advisers', the Americans are spending millions of dollars on American contractors 
like Creative Associates, Inc or the Research Triangle International, who are supposed 
to teach the Iraqis how to have civil society. 
The other approach, which is more common among the British and US State 
department officials, is what might be described as 'realist' or pragmatic. This 
involves the handover of power to existing political parties or tribal and religious 
leaders. 
Both approaches could combine to produce a weak state scenario. The ideological 
approach further compounds the humiliation felt by many Iraqis and contributes to the 
sense of a broken society. It is effective at destruction but much less effective at 
construction. The 'realist' approach strengthens particularist forces. This could easily 
be reinforced by Iraqi political dynamics. The secular parties are largely limited to 
Baghdad. If regional elections were to be held in Iraq today the individual 
governorates will be dominated by this or the other of the particularist parties or local 
strongmen. National elections, on the other hand, are likely to result in a fragmented 
parliament where secular parties could have sufficient presence to counterbalance the 
particularists. A decentralized state framework with a small government will further 
enhance the influence of the latter. For example the new proposal to elect regional 
caucuses who would in turn elect a parliament to replace the Governing Council is 
likely to result in the removal of many secular groups or the significant reduction of 
their weight in government institutions. 
Unlike other post totalitarian and post conflict societies, perceptions about the security 
situation in Iraq today means that all but the most committed international activists 
are staying away. The absence of such institutions as the United Nations, the 
European Union or NGOs like the ICRC or Oxfam is striking for anyone who has 
visited recent zones of conflict. One positive consequence was that we did not see any 
of the crowding out which is typical in these situations by the better organized and 
endowed international NGO's. Iraqi initiatives are allowed the space to develop their 
own identity and initiatives. On the other hand some form of international presence is 
necessary to provide the Iraqis with support when and where they needed and to 
promote a third approach, different from either ideological or the 'realist', aimed at 
providing a framework for bottom-up democracy. There is a need within the CPA, the 
Governing Council and at local levels for much greater for expertise in the areas of 
transition, development and post-war reconstruction. Even more importantly, the 
international agencies confer legitimacy on democratic initiatives, which are 
otherwise largely bereft of outside support. This is why a greater role for international 
institutions is crucial to the handover of sovereignty. 
This third democratic approach may take time but is more likely to produce a stable 
outcome. Such an approach would aim to close the political and security vacuum and 
reduce the space that can be exploited by the terrorists. Some initiatives that might 
contribute to such an approach include: 
5.1 Political proposals 
• There needs to be public political mobilisation against the violence.  
• The process of constitution making needs to be opened up to public discussion 
through debates in the media, in universities, women's groups and mosques.  
• A level playing field should be created for all non-violent Iraqi political and 
civil society groups.  
• Institutions for transitional justice need to be established quickly. De-
Ba'athification should be conducted from the vantage point of prosecuting 
criminals rather than dismissing party members.  
• The proposal by some women's groups for a supreme gender council, which 
would ensure 30% women's participation in all major state organs could also 
contribute to broader democratic representation.  
• Religious groups should be given the task of rebuilding the mosques and the 
Hawza so as to direct their energies to religious tasks and re-establish the 
importance of the religious centres of Iraq.  
5.2 Security proposals 
• Every effort should be made to minimise the impact of counter-terrorist 
operations on Iraqi civilians. The coalition should track and report the number 
of civilian casualties, investigate, prosecute, compensate and report on all 
cases of wrongful killing/harm to civilian lives and property.  
• Stipends to members of the demobilised Iraqi army should be paid as 
promised.  
• Every effort should be made to eliminate para-military groups and/or to 
incorporate them into security institutions through a rigorous and transparent 
process  
• Security institutions need to be strengthened, especially the police and the 
judiciary. Politicians should not be allowed undue interference in the makeup 
of these institutions.  
5.3 Economic proposals 
• Delay privatisation of state enterprises but encourage new private investment  
• Establish an independent board for managing aid and oil revenues composed 
of representatives of donors and independent governors from parties and from 
civil society.  
• Give priority to reconstruction of war-damaged infrastructure  
5.4 International proposals 
• International organizations and individual experts should be brought in to 
provide legitimacy and knowledge to the tasks at hand.  
• Iraq's neighbours should be offered the possibility to contribute to Iraq's 
reconstruction 
 
